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THE NINTH AMENDMENT:
GUIDEPOST TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Our peculiar security is in the possession of a written Constitution.
Let us not make it a blank paper by construction ....
THOMAS JEFFERSON
INTRODUCTION
In the long history of the United States Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, the Supreme Court and the lower courts of competent juris-
diction, acting upon the grant of judicial power vested in them by
virtue of Article III of the Constitution, have acted as the ultimate and
supreme arbiters of its provisions.2 In this capacity, the Supreme Court
has been diligent in filling its many and varied provisions with sub-
stantive content.
However, in the almost two centuries of Constitutional adjudication,
the Court has been virtually silent on one of the basic and fundamental
charter members of this venerable document. Either it has been pur-
posely ignored or it was ultimately forgotten soon after its inception
in 1789. Consequently, the Ninth Amendment entered into this cen-
tury virtually unscathed and utterly void of any attempt by the courts
to define and apply it.
The Ninth Amendment simply states:
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
Surely, this Amendment must have had some meaning because the
members of the First Congress had felt it imperative that it be included
within the Bill of Rights. Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall indicated
this when he stated that "it cannot be presumed that any clause in the
constitution is intended to be without effect". 3 Therefore, if we pre-
sume, as Marshall stated generally, that the Ninth Amendment has
1. 4 JEFFERsoN, WmTNGs 506 (Washington ed. 1859).
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 176 (1803). See, Cooper v. Telfair,
4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800). In Albeman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 520 (1859),
it was stated that "by the very terms of the grant, the Constitution is under their view
when any act of Congress is brought before them, and it is their duty to declare the
law void, and refuse to execute it, if it is not pursuant to the legislative powers con-
ferred upon Congress."
3. Marbury v. Madison, id., at 174. See, Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212
(1827) and Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
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meaning and effect, what is that effect and meaning that has evaded a
proper judicial interpretation for almost two centuries of Constitutional
history? Does it contain rights which have not been infringed upon to
date; or is it a statement of policy; or, further, is it a rule of construc-
don; or does it contain some other underlying meaning which has
escaped proper judicial interpretation and application throughout the
years?
Legal scholars and eminent jurists have been equally puzzled as to
the ultimate meaning of this nebulous article.4 This confusion has re-
sulted in the present dilemma concerning the interpretation and true
meaning of the Ninth Amendment. The purpose of this discussion will
be an attempt to cast a little light upon the darkness that has surrounded
this Amendment from its inception down through the present day and
to define it and to show how the Ninth Amendment can be applied
to the protection of fundamental rights.
In attempting to analyze and dissect this Amendment to determine
its ultimate meaning, it is essential first to decipher what its drafters
meant when they included it among the other amendments compris-
ing the Bill of Rights. Historical precedent is then one of the paths
to a further understanding as to why the drafters included it, what
meaning they meant to convey, and what ultimate purpose they hoped
to accomplish by its inclusion.
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
In delving into the language and background of the Ninth Amend-
4. See generally the following: JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AmIElCAN
SYsrEm OF GovRMmENr 74-75 (1955) in which Mr. Justice Jackson stated that "the
Ninth Amendment rights, which are not to be disturbed by the Federal Government are
still a mystery to me"; Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 871 (1960) in
which Mr. Justice Black stated that it was included merely to "emphasize the limited
nature of the Federal Government"; Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amend-
ment, 42 VA. L. REv. 627, 641 (1956) in which Professor Dunbar felt that it was simply
a "principle of construction"; DumBAuLD, THE BIL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MFANs
TODAY 63-65 (1st ed. 1957) in which the author felt that it was "a dead letter in
practice" and, therefore "destitute of substantive effect"; Hamlin, The Bill of Rigbts
or the First Ten Amendments to the US. Constitution, 68 CoM. L. J. 233, 235-236 (1963)
in which Mr. Justice Hamlin of the Supreme Court of Louisiana found that "(t)he
Ninth Amendment is a basic statement of and protects the inherent natural rights of
the individual"; and Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND.
L. J. 309, 320 (1936) in which the author found that "(i)t must be a positive declaration
of the existing though unnamed rights, which may be vindicated under the authority
of the Amendment".
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ment, it should not be considered apart from the other nine amend-
ments commonly referred to as the Bill of Rights. Rather it should
be considered in its historical perspective among the other amendments
drafted by James Madison and submitted to the First Congress. The
original incentive for a bill of retained rights stemmed from the fact
that the Constitution, as originally drafted, contained no such declara-
tion but rather created a strong, central government of express and
implied powers. Many of the states favored such a declaration but
relented, upon adoption of the Constitution, until a later date when it
could be amended to it.
However, upon ratification of the Constitution by the required
number of states,5 strong opposition to a Bill of Rights formed and
those opponents were led by Alexander Hamilton of New York and
James Wilson of Pennsylvania. They felt that it was not only unneces-
sary but that such inclusion could prove to be dangerous.6
Hamilton best stated the arguments for the opponents and restated
Wilson's position 7 when he wrote:
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the
extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in
the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They
would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this
very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than
were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which
there is no power to do?8
Madison, for the proponents of a Bill of Rights, felt that the new
government was one of delegated and enumerated powers, limited in
extent. Thus, he did not feel it to be an absolute necessity. He was,
however, agreeable to its inclusion in order to insure the whole-hearted
support of all the states toward the new government and to further
insure that, in certain areas, the federal government would be pre-
cluded from acting and in others, it would act only in a particular
manner.
9
5. In accordance with the U.S. Const. art. VII, which states that "(t)he Ratification
of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this
Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same", New Hampshire, on June 21,
1788, became the ninth state to ratify the Constitution.
6. 2 JEFFERSON, Womics 329, 358. See also 3 JEFFEaSON, op. cit. supra at 4, 13, and 101.
7. See, 2 ELuor, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTTUnoN 436-437 (2d ed. 1836).
8. THE FEDERALIST No. S4 at 537 (Lodge ed. 1888) (Hamilton).
9. See generally, Rogge, Unenumerated Rigbts, 47 CALn. L. REv. 787, 792 (1959).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Upon ratification by the states of the Constitution in their respective
conventions, several adopted certain resolutions to be affixed to their
ratifications. These resolutions formed the basis for Madison when he
drafted the amendments for submission to the First Congress. One of
these resolutions, adopted initially by Virginia and New York,' ° formed
the nucleus for what was later to become the Ninth Amendment. This
resolution adopted by Virginia stated:
17th. That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not ex-
ercise certain powers, be not interpreted, in any manner whatsoever
to extend the powers of Congress; but that they be construed either
as making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be the
case or otherwise, as inserted merely for greater caution."
In drafting these amendments, Madison wanted them to contain
"guarantees of procedural decency and a declaration of the rights of
conscience. What he further propose.(d).... in the Ninth Amendment,
was an affirmation of the principle that, as rights in the United States
are not created by government, so they are not to be diminished by
government, unless by the appropriate exercise of an express power". 12
Upon completion of these amendments, he introduced them into the
First Congress for consideration.
In presenting, his proposals to the Congress, Madison read the last
part of his fourth proposition which was, in essence, the earlier pro-
posal adopted by Virginia and New York13 and which was, as it was
stated previously, the embryo of the Ninth Amendment. It read:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor
of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just
importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge
10. 1 ELmioT, supra note 7 at 327. It was stated that "those clauses in the said Con-
stitution, which declare that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not
imply that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said Constitution; but such
clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified powers, or as in-
serted merely for greater caution".
11. 3 ELLioT, supra note 7 at 661.
12. Dunbar, supra note 4 at 637. See, Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897)
in which the Court stated: "The first ten amendments .... were not meant to lay
down any novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain guarantees
and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had
from time immemorial been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions".
13. Supra notes 10 and 11.
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the powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as actual limi-
tations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.14
Further along in his presentation, Madison proceeded to answer his
critics, namely Hamilton and Wilson, when he stated:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating
particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those
rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow
by implication that those rights which were not singled out, were
intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government,
and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible
arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of
rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against.
I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause
of the fourth resolution.15
In essence, Madison answered his critics and also showed that his reso-
lution would obviate the possibility of applying the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius'6 in interpreting the Bill of Rights. Thus, it
appears that one of the paramount reasons for the inclusion of the
Ninth Amendment into the Bill of Rights was to obviate the effect of
this maxim.17  However, the key to its ultimate meaning was never
voiced by its author.
In summation to this cursory history of the Ninth Amendment and
the Bill of Rights, it can be said that their adoption was a condition
precedent to ratification by the states of the Constitution"8 and this
14. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789) (1789-1824).
15. Id., at 439.
16. Rep. James Jackson of Georgia best defined this term when, in objecting to
Madison's proposal for including a Bill of Rights into the Constitution, he stated:
"There is a maxim in law, and it will apply to bills of rights, that when you enumerate
exceptions, the exceptions operate to the exclusion of all circumstances that are omitted;
consequently, unless you except every right from the grant of power, those omitted
are inferred to be resigned to the discretion of the Government." Id., at 442.
17. See, 2 STORY ON T CONSTItUTON 651 (5th ed. 1891). Mr. Justice Story felt that
the Ninth Amendment was included merely to obviate this maxim of law. In stating
his position, he wrote:
This clause was manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse or ingenius mis-
application of the well-known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases
implied a negation in all others, and e converso that a negation in particular cases
implies an affirmation in all others. The maxim, rightly understood is perfectly
sound and safe, but it has often been strangely forced from its natural meaning
into the support of the most dangerous political heresies.
See also, 2 STORY, op. cit. supra at 626-627.
18. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 370 (1892).
1966]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
is verified by the wording of the preamble to the joint resolution of
Congress submitting these amendments to the states.' 9
The adoption of the Bill of Rights, however, left many unanswered
questions which had to await judicial interpretation. One such question
concerned whether the first ten amendments granted the rights enu-
merated therein to the people or did it merely act as a shield in the
protection of rights which the people already possessed? Judge Cooley
answered this question when he held that bills of rights were meant to
protect preexisting rights.20 Assuming this to be true, what are these
rights and how far can they be infringed upon by government before
they come into conflict with the Constitution? Obviously, the rights
protected are too numerous for compilation, but the courts have en-
deavored, since the inception of the Constitution, to fill its various
provisions with substantive content and to delineate those rights re-
served and protected from infringement. Judge Learned Hand, with-
out delineating these rights, defined them as those "arising out of
'Natural Laws', inherent in the structure of any society or at least
any civilized society". 21
Consequently, it appears that the Bill of Rights was meant to protect
natural, inherent, and fundamental rights. This is precisely how the
courts have applied the first eight amendments. However, the courts
have either forgotten or purposely ignored the Ninth Amendment.
This might be due to the fact that the first eight amendments con-
tain virtually all specific provisions whereas the Ninth Amendment
is general and broad in scope. Surely the Amendment must have had
some meaning pertinent to the protection of those fundamental rights
but that meaning, contained only within the mind of Madison and the
other drafters, has so far eluded a proper judicial interpretation and
application.
19. 1 Stat. 97 (1789). "The conventions of a number of States having at the time
of their adopting the Constitution expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruc-
tion or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be
added: And as extending the ground of public confidence in the government will best
insure the beneficent ends of its institution."
20. In Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, 214 (1874), Judge Cooley stated that "(t)he
Bills of Rights in the American Constitutions have not been drafted for the introduction
of new law, but to secure old principles against abrogation or violation. They are
conservatory instruments rather than reformatory; and they assume that the existing
principles of the common law are ample for the protection of individual rights, when
once incorporated in the fundamental law, and thus secured against violation". See
CooLEY, CONSTTTIONAL LIMrrATIONS 47 (5th ed. 1883).
21. L. HAND, THE BiLu OF RIGHTs 2 (1958).
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One view has been that the Ninth Amendment was included be-
cause the drafters felt that it was impossible to supply every detail of
our national existence. Therefore, any rights not included among the
first eight amendments were to be found in the Ninth. These rights
were not excluded because they were different but because words
were considered inadequate to express all the rights found in a free
society.22
Madison, himself, expressed a similar position; i.e., that words were
incapable of expressing complex ideas with complete accuracy, when
he stated in The Federalist No. 37 that "no language is so copious as
to supply words and phrases for every complex idea". 23 It appears
then that "the fear that certain rights may have been omitted, and that
the vagaries of language might adversely affect other rights intended
to be included, led Madison to the Ninth Amendment". 24 From this,
it might be deduced that Madison meant to protect all rights within
the first eight amendments but due to the fear that the words used
might not be sufficient to express the desired meaning, he inserted the
Ninth Amendment to serve as a "declaration, should the need for it
arise, that the people had other rights than those enumerated in the
first eight amendments" 25 to the Constitution.
With this idea firmly in mind, it would next be imperative to ex-
amine the few opinions handed down by the courts during the almost
two centuries since its adoption to determine their interpretation of it
and what significance, if any, they have found contained therein.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
Early in the 19th Century, the Supreme Court, without specifically
ruling upon the Ninth Amendment, handed down their momentous
decision in Barron v. Baltimore26 in which they stated that the first
ten amendments were applicable only as to the federal government and
22. Redlich, Are There Certain Rights.... Retained By The People?, 37 N.Y.U.L.
Rnv. 787, 810-811 (1962). See Kelsey, supra note 4 at 320.
23. TaE FEDERALISr No. 37 at 236 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison).
24. Redlich, supra note 22 at 798.
25. See generally, Rogge, supra note 9 at 793.
26. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242, 250 (1833). This was a claim by an individual that city
officials had taken his property for a public use without just compensation in violation
of the Fifth Amendment. Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall, speaking for the Court, and
referring to the first ten amendments, ruled: "These amendments contain no expression
indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments. This court cannot so
apply them."
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did not act as restraints upon the state governments. In a later case 2
during the same term, the Supreme Court held that in light of the
earlier Barron case, the Ninth Amendment could not extend its pro-
tection as a restraint upon the states. Thus, early in its history, the
Ninth Amendment lost what little vitality it might have had by being
restricted in use only to the federal government and not as a limitation
upon the states. The Court, however, did not shed any light on the
possible interpretation of this amendment or what rights were to be
protected by it.
Later in the 19th Century, without ruling directly upon it, the Court
in Loan Association v. Topeka28 viewed the Amendment as speaking
of a government of limited and defined powers and "implied reserva-
tions of individual rights, without which the social compact could not
exist, and which are respected by all governments entitled to the
name." 29 Without specifically defining it, the Court seemed to be
holding that the Ninth Amendment was not only a statement of policy
but also an acknowledgment that certain individual rights, fundamen-
tal in a free society, could be exonerated by virtue of this Amendment.
By and large, however, the courts were virtually silent on the im-
plications of the Ninth Amendment throughout all of the 19th Cen-
tury and the early part of the 20th Century. Then, as the power of
government began to expand into the sphere of what had previously
been considered to be the exclusive domain of private individuals, a
few litigants cited the Ninth Amendment to support their claim that
government had encroached upon those rights which were meant to
be "retained by the people". The government countered by stating
that when an implied right is advanced, one must look to see whether
there is an express or implied power given by the Constitution to the
federal government to do the alleged act. If there is, then the govern-
ment should prevail.
This position was best stated by Chief Justice Hughes in Ashwanzder
v. Tennessee Valley Authority80 when he said in reply to the plaintiff's
contention that the government, by engaging in the business of selling
27. Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 468 (1833). See, e.g., Ohio v.
Dollison, 194 U.S. 445 (1904); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899); Elvaine v.
Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891); and Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
28. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
29. Id., at 662-663. See generally, the language of Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
30. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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electrical power in competition with private concerns, was encroach-
ing upon a retained right:
To the extent that the power of disposition is thus expressly con-
ferred, it is manifest that the Tenth Amendment is not applicable.
And the Ninth Amendment, in insuring the maintenance of the rights
retained by the people, does not withdraw the rights which are ex-
pressly granted to the Federal Goverment. 31
At this point, the courts had still failed to either apply the Ninth
Amendment or to show when and how it might be appropriate to
invoke it. In fact, the courts seemed to be taking a negative approach
toward the amendment and to show only what it did not protect. In
1939, for instance, a district court held that the right of asylum3 2 was
not one of the rights retained by the people. Also, the right of an
enlisted man to be tried before a court martial composed of enlisted
men was not a right protected by this Amendment.3" The absolute use
of the mails was also held not to be one of those rights retained. 4
Litigation contesting the extent of federal regulation has also caused
several litigants to cite the Ninth Amendment in support of their claim
of federal encroachment upon their "retained" rights." However, the
courts have always managed to parry this thrust by simply pointing to
31. Id., at 330-331. See also, United States v. Gearhart, 7 F. Supp. 712, 716 (D.C.
Colorado 1934), appeal dismissed, 77 F. 2d 1017 (10th Cir. 1935) and Tennessee Electric
Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
32. Ex parte Kurth, 28 F. Supp. 259 (D.C.S.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Kurth
v. Carr, 106 F. 2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1939).
33. W helchel v. McDonald, 176 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd, 340 U.S. 122, rehearing
denied, 340 U.S. 923 (1950).
34. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, rehearing denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957). The
Court held, in ruling upon the constitutionality of a federal obscenity statute which
punished the using of the mails to send obscene material, that obscenity is not within
the area of constitutionally protected press and speech. Therefore, the statute does not
unconstitutionally encroach upon the rights and powers reserved by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments to the states and to the people to punish speech and press where it is
found to be offensive to decency and morality. The statute, in question, was found
to be a proper exercise of the postal power delegated to Congress by U.S. Const. art. I,
sec. 8.
35. Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948). The Court found that a continu-
ance of wartime rent controls was necessary even, for a short time, after the war was
over until the economy could be stabilized on a peacetime basis. Thus, this was a proper
exercise of the war power delegated by the U.S. Const. art. I, see. 8 and did not infringe
upon Ninth and Tenth Amendment rights. See also, Commonwealth and Southern
Corp. v. SEC, 134 F. 2d 747 (3rd Cir. 1943) (SEC order directing a change in corporate
structure was a valid exercise of the commerce power and did not violate the Ninth
Amendment).
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an appropriate power, either express or implied, which was delegated
to the federal government by the Constitution.
Consequently, until 1947, the courts had not successfully applied the
Ninth Amendment in the protection of one fundamental right. At this
point, 158 years after the adoption of this Amendment, it remained
virtually undisturbed from its original state and utterly void of sub-
stantive content. But in 1947, the Supreme Court in United Public
Workers v. MitcbelIN found that the Ninth Amendment protected the
fundamental and inherent "right of a citizen to act as a party official or
worker to further his own political views". 3 However, in this case,
in which appellants were contesting the constitutionality of the Hatch
Act's prohibitions of political activity by government employees, the
Court admitted that these were fundamental rights retained by the
people under the Ninth Amendment but countered by showing that
here, also, was a valid exercise by the Federal Government of a dele-
gated power and that its was therefore justified.38 As a result, from the
inception of the Ninth Amendment through 1947, the only right which
had been judicially recognized was the right to engage in political
activity and that right was subject to reasonable regulation by Congress.
Then, in 1965, Mr. Justice Goldberg, in concurring with the Su-
preme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut"9 in which the
For some interesting state cases in this area, see generally, Kape v. Home Bank &
Trust Co., 370 IMl. 170, 18 N.E. 2d 170 (1938) (Federal Bankruptcy power is not limited
by the Ninth Amendment); Gernatt v. Huiet, 192 Ga. 729, 16 S.E.2d 587 (1941) (Georgia
Unemployment Compensation Act did not violate this Amendment); and State v.
Sprague, 105 New Hamp. 355, 200 A.2d 206 (1964) (The Ninth Amendment does not
preclude a state under its police power from implementing racial equality).
36. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
37. Id., at 94, 95-96.
38. Id., at 95-96. The Court stated: "Of course, it is accepted constitutional doctrine
that these fundamental human rights are not absolutes ... Therefore, when objection
is made that the exercise of a federal power infringes upon rights reserved by the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the inquiry must be directed toward the granted power
under which the action of the Union was taken. If granted power is found, necessarily
the objection of invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments, must fail." See also, United States v. Painters Union, 79 F. Supp. 516 (D.C. Conn.
1948, rev'd on other grounds, 172 F. 2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949) (The Ninth Amendment
doesn't protect labor unions seeking to engage in political activity which is forbidden
by statute).
For an interesting state court decision, see generally, Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Comm. v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 380 P.2d 34 (1962) in which the court recognized, as one
of the unenumerated rights protected by the Ninth Amendment, the right of a man
to acquire a home for himself and his dependents.
39. 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
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Court declared Connecticut's birth-control law unconstitutional, found
that the right to marital privacy was one of the fundamental and basic
rights "retained by the people" within the meaning. of the Ninth
Amendment. However, he reached this result by a far different inter-
pretation than had ever been used previous to this time concerning the
Amendment when he stated:
(T)he Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support to the view
that the "liberty" protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments from infringement by the Federal Government or the States
is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight
amendments.40
Thus, Mr. Justice Goldberg is not holding that the Ninth Amend-
ment constitutes an independent source of rights protected from in-
fringement by either the States or the Federal Government. Rather,
he feels that it "shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fun-
damental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight
amendments and an intent that the list of rights included there not
be exhausted". 41 In effect, he is saying that these fundamental, unenu-
merated rights should not be denied the appropriate safeguards sim-
ply because they were not expressly provided for in the first eight
amendments. In fact, in this instance, he simply used the Ninth Amend-
ment to show that the intent was present to protect the right of marital
privacy and then declared that, since it was meant to be protected, a
state could not encroach upon this right without depriving the indi-
vidual of his liberty without the "due process of law" guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Therefore, it appears from this last decision that a proper interpreta-
tion of the Ninth Amendment is that it is a statement of intent; an
intent that these fundamental, inherent, but unenumerated rights not
specifically listed should nevertheless be protected.
However, this in turn poses two basic questions. First, what kind
of rights are these unenumerated rights; and, second, in what provision
in the first eight amendments should they find appropriate protection
if the Ninth Amendment offers none?
To answer the first question, it must be first determined as to what
kind of rights the first eight amendments were intended to protect.
Mr. Justice Brown in Brown v. Walker'2 defined them as follows:
40. Id., at 1686.
41. Ibid.
42. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
1966]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
(T)he object of the first eight amendments to the Constitution was
to incorporate into the fundamental law of the land certain principles
of natural justice.43
Therefore, these amendments were intended to protect natural or fun-
damental rights. Applying to this concept the ejusdem generis rule,"4
the only conclusion to be reached is that the Ninth Amendment was
meant to protect those fundamental or natural rights not specifically
enumerated in the first eight amendments.45
In answer to the second question as to where these rights should be
protected if the Ninth Amendment only shows an intent to protect
them, a closer look at the first eight amendments will show that all
those amendments contain specific provisions. But to protect funda-
mental unenumerated rights, a general provision applying to this class
of rights must be found. In the Fifth Amendment, the only possible
phrase which has a general import is the "due process provision," for
there is none other that could cover this general class of fundamental
rights. The Fourteenth Amendment contains a similar provision which
applies to the states whereas the Fifth Amendment applies strictly to
the Federal Government.
It was stated earlier that, by interpretation, it appears that Madison
meant, when he drafted the Bill of Rights, that all fundamental and
inherent rights were to be protected by virtue of the first eight amend-
ments. If this is so, then it would follow that the only logical provision
for the protection of those unenumerated rights would be the "due
process of law" provisions of the Fifth and later the Fourteenth
Amendments. However, before this conclusion is reached, it would
be appropriate to look back to the history and judicial interpretation
of this historic phrase.
43. Id., at 600.
44. "In the construction of laws, wills, and other instruments, the 'ejusdern generis
rule' is, that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words
of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same
general kind or class as those specifically mentioned." BLACK, LAW DICtIONARY (4th
ed. 1957).
45. For a brief discussion of the Ninth Amendment, see generally, Hamlin, The Bill
of Rights or the First Ten Amendments to the U. S. Constitution, 68 COM. L. J. 233,
235-236 (1963).
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THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND "DUE PROCESS OF LAW"
The definitive and substantive term "due process of law" is traceable
back to that ancient English declaration of rights, Magna Carta. How-
ever, it did not appear in its present form in that venerable document
but rather as another general phrase, "law of the land." Chapter 39
of Magna Carta stated the guarantee in its entirety as follows:
No freeman shall be taken or [and] imprisoned or disseised or ex-
iled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or [and] by the law
of the land.46
Although at that time it was meant as a procedural safeguard, it
began immediately to expand in scope and importance. In 1354, this
protection was reiterated in the Statute of Westminster of the Liberties
of London47 but an important and far-reaching substitution was made
in which the phrase "due process of the law" replaced the older and
more ambiguous phrase "law of the land." We are doubtless indebted
to this misconception between the two phrases for the cross-fertiliza-
tion of them made possible a hybrid concept, which,. under the skillful
nurturing of Lord Coke, gathered so much of the concepts of liberty
and order that it became the simplest and most far-reaching of con-
stitutional phrases.4" Thus, side by side with the idea of the common
law as an element in the English Constitution, there arose the concep-
tion of natural law and natural rights.
Lord Coke furthered this theory by pressing the idea of judicial
control through the interpretation of Magna Carta. He laid the foun-
dations for this idea in Calvin's Case48 and stated it more clearly the
following year in Dr. Bonba~rns Case. 0 In spite of his decisions, how-
46. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 375 (Glascow 1914).
47. The Statute of Westminster of the Liberties of London, 1354, 28 Edw. 3, c. 3.
"Item, that no man of what estate or condition that he be, shall be put out of Land or
tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being
brought in answer by due process of the law."
48. For a good discussion on this point, see generally, HANNiS TAYLOR, Dun PROCESs
OF LAW 8-12 (Chicago 1917).
49. 7 Co. Rep. 1 (1608). Coke's decision was to the effect that Parliament might not
take away certain fundamental rights of a citizen. If it did, then it was the duty of the
King to step in and aid the injured party.
50. 8 Co. Rep. 114a (1610). Coke, in his opinion for the court, stated: "And it
appears in our books that in many cases the common law will controul Acts of Par-
liament, and sometimes adjudge them utterly void, for when an Act of Parliament is
against common right and reason, or repugnant or impossible to be performed, the
common law will controul it and adjudge such act to be void."
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ever, by the middle of the 18th Century, it was firmly established that
Parliament was supreme and the courts, in contrast to Coke's philoso-
phy, had no power of judicial review over Acts of Parliament." Eng-
lish opinion was not unanimously behind this theory and Coke's phi-
losophy, which stressed the importance of "due process of law" and
its fundamental character in the English Constitution as a norm for the
determination of the validity of statutes, persisted and continued to in-
fluence opinion in the subject.
It was probably this original feeling on the part of the Commons
that led to a transcription of Chapter 39 of Magna Carta into the Peti-
tion of Right5 2 in 1627 rather than a mere paraphrase of it. It was con-
sidered that this section protected the people from arbitrary action of
any kind, while others thought that it summed up the rights of English-
men with regard to life, liberty and property.
This thought, concerning the meaning of "due process of law,"
also permeated the English Colonies in America through two channels.
In the first place, many colonists ventured to England to study in the
Inns of Court of London. There they studied the old classics of the
law and it was but natural that they should gain a reverence for Coke
and his school of thought. Therefore Coke had a great influence on
legal thought in the Colonies prior to the Revolution. Also, the due
process provision (Chapter 39) of Magna Carta, in the century and
three-quarters prior to the Revolution, had been cited and its protection
invoked more often than any other provision of the document. It
becomes evident, therefore, that the colonists would view "due process
of law" as a guarantee which had a wide, varied, and indefinite scope.
Since there had never been a serious attempt to define it, it was note-
51. 1 BLAcKsToN, Co r mAmies ox THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 91 (17th ed. Christian
1830).
52. Petition of Right, 1627, 3 Car. 1, c. 1, s. 3. "And where alsoe by the Statute
called the Great Charter of the liberties of England, it is declared and enacted, that no
freeman may be taken or imprisoned or be disseised of his freehold or liberties or his
free customes or be outlawed or exiled or in any manner destroyed, but by the lawful
judgment of his peeres or by the law of the land."
In section 4 of this Act, 28 Edw. 3, c. 3, supra note 47, was also included in which it
stated: "And in the eight and twentieth yeere of the raigne of King Edward the Third
it was declared and enacted by authoritie of Parliament, that no man of what estate
or condicion that he be, should be put out of his land or tenements nor taken nor
imprisoned nor disinherited nor put to death without being brought to aunswere by
due processe of lawe."
The inclusion of these two provisions, one following the other, gave impetus to
those contending that the two clauses "law of the land" and "due process of law" were
equivalents of one another.
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worthy that they should seize upon it. Although it seems that they did
not realize all that this provision encompassed, it is certain that they
realized that it had a more far-reaching aspect than merely guarantee-
ing proper procedure in criminal cases. 3
In conclusion, in reviewing the importance of this provision in our
Constitutional jurisprudence, it matters little whether the colonists were
historically correct in their interpretation of it. The important con-
sideration in the development of "due process of law" is not so much
its original meaning but what the colonists considered the content of
the phrase to be for it was this meaning which they transferred into
the first state constitutions54 and the Federal Constitution in the Fifth
Amendment'5 and later into the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
In adopting the "due process" provision into these two amendments,
the drafters also incorporated into it the natural rights of life, liberty,
and property which Blackstone considered to be the fundamental rights
of Englishmen.5 7 Thus, it appears that the drafters intended that the
general scope of this provision was to insure to every person those
fundamental and inalienable rights of life, liberty, and property, which
are inherent in every man, and to protect all men against the arbitrary
exercise of governmental powers in violation and disregard of estab-
lished principles of justice.
It has also been said that the "due process" provision bore a close
relationship to the doctrine of natural rights which was embodied
53. See generally, MoTr, DuE PRocEss OF LAW 87-90, 111, 123 (1926).
54. Virginia was the first colony to draft a Bill of Rights. It was drafted by George
Mason and adopted by the Virginia Convention on June 12, 1776. The "law of the land"
provision was included as a postscript to Article VIII of this document.
55. U.S. Const. amend. V. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service
in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."
56. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, qvithout due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
57. 1 BLAc SToNE, supra note 51 at 129-144. See also, Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L. J. 309, 313 (1936).
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in the Declaration of Independence.5 8 This same generalization has
also been stated concerning the Ninth Amendment." Thus, it begins
to appear that the same kind and class of rights inferred in the Ninth
Amendment were also meant to be protected under the "due process
of law" provisions of the Constitution.
At this point it would be appropriate to turn to the courts to exam-
ine the manner in which they have defined and applied this pro-
vision to the protection of fundamental, natural and unenumerated
rights. Possibly the most famous definition of "due process" was given
by Daniel Webster when, in the Dartmouth College6 case, he cor-
related it to the older "law of the land" provision and stated:
By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law; a
law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry,
and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is that every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the
protection of the general rules which govern society."'
It appears then that this provision, meant to secure person and prop-
crty from arbitrary action, should be liberally construed. 2 Therefore,
the courts have found it necessary to expand the "liberty" provision
contained in the amendments to include many of the fundamental,
unenumerated rights which were, as Mr. Justice Cardozo stated, "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty". "
Liberty was best defined when in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,4 it was
held:
58. Morr, supra note 53, at 273.
59. Hamlin, The Bill of Rights or the First Ten Amendments to the U. S. Constitu-
tion, 68 COM. L. J. 233, 236 (1963). Mr. Justice Hamlin stated that "(t)he Declara-
tion of Independence mentions rights to which the laws of nature and nature's God
entitle all men, among these being life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The
Declaration of Independence was a forerunner of the Ninth Amendment, and when
it used the words "nature's God" and "among these", it purposely did not enumerate
the rights. It was careful to state that liberties and human rights were not man made,
and could not be enumerated."
60. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
61. This statement was quoted with approval in Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409, 418
(1897).
62. See the language of Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
635 (1886). See generally, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884); Holden
v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898); and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), rev'd on1
other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
63. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
64. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right
of a citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person,
as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of
the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free
to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or
avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may
be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.65
In light of this historical and judicial precedent, one would naturally
feel that the "due process of law" provisions were intended to protect
basic, inherent, and fundamental rights. In relation to the Fifth Amend-
ment provision, the courts have so held. However, in relation to the
Fourteenth Amendment provision, a massive judicial conflict has re-
sulted. This was pointed out in Adamson v. California"6 in which Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring with the majority, advocated a flexible
standard of due process in the protection of individual liberties while
Mr. Justice Black, speaking with the minority, advocated a belief that
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to incorporate the Bill of
Rights and make them applicable against the states. The majority,
however, have continued to prevail and, since that time, have held that
the Fourteenth Amendment absorbs and applies to the States those
specific protections of the first eight amendments which express funda-
mental personal rights.67
As far as the fundamental and basic rights of individuals which were
not specifically enumerated, the Supreme Court, in adopting a more
flexible standard of "due process," has been equally active in their
protection. In a number of decisions, the Court has recognized the
65. Id., at 589. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) and
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
66. 332 U.S. 46 (1947). See also, Palko v. Connecticut, supra note 63; Reynolds v.
Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1961); McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961); and Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
67. See, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) and Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375
(1962) (First Amendment); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), rev'd on other
grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment); Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1. (1964) (Fifth
Amendment); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Sixth Amendment); and
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Eighth Amendment).
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right of an individual to be let alone,6 the right to engage in political
activity and the right to political privacy,69 the right to travel,70 the
right to educate one's children,7' the right to marry, establish a home,
and bring up children,"' the freedom of inquiry, thought, and to teach
freely,73 and the right to marital privacy.74 In other words, as Mr. Jus-
tice Cardozo stated many years ago, the due process clause protects
those liberties that are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental". "
At this point, it would be well to turn back to the Ninth Amend-
ment for a closer analysis. Earlier in this discussion, it was interpreted
that Madison intended for all rights both procedural and substantive, to
be protected by the first eight amendments. As it was shown pre-
viously, this is in effect what the courts have done. Through judicial
interpretation, it was shown that the Ninth Amendment was meant
to be a statement of intent; an intention that those fundamental, un-
enumerated rights were nevertheless meant to be protected and also
to show that the enumerated rights were not meant to exclude others
nor to be exhaustive. Then, it was shown that since all rights were
meant to be protected, there had to be some general provision within
the first eight amendments which might possibly serve this end. By
close analysis, the "due process of law" clause was found to be such a
provision and this was supported by historical analysis and judicial
precedent. It was also discovered that the courts had been protecting
fundamental but unenumerated rights by virtue of this clause. In ad-
68. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
69. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), reversing, 121 A.2d 783 (1956).
See also, United Public Workers, CIO v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
70. See, Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941); Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-126
(1958); and Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 505 (1964).
71. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
72. Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922). See, the opinion of Mr.
Justice McReynolds in defining the liberty guaranteed under the due process clause.
See also, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
73. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
74. Griswold v. Connecticut, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965). See also, Mr. Justice Harlan's dis-
senting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961).
75. Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
For an interesting proposal concerning the invalidation of compulsory unionism on
the grounds that the right to work free from the compulsion of joining a union is a
basic and fundamental right, see generally, Everett McKinley Dirksen, Individual
Freedom Versus Compulsory Unionism: A Constitutional Problem, 15 DEPAuL L. R v.
259 (1966).
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dition, it was determined that both the Ninth Amendment and the
"due process" clause were found to contain that doctrine of natural
rights which was embodied in the Declaration of Independence.78
In looking at the Ninth Amendment in its entirety, it simply states:
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
When the words "shall not be construed" are analyzed, it is apparent
that the Amendment was directed specifically to the courts for long
ago it was held that the Supreme Court was the ultimate and supreme
arbiter of the Constitution and upon that Court lay the task of inter-
preting or construing it.77 In further dissecting this Amendment, Mr.
Justice Black stated that (t)he use of the words, 'the people' in both
these Amendments (Ninth and Tenth) strongly emphasizes the desire
of the Framers to protect individual liberty". 78 Thus, the Ninth
Amendment was a direction to the judiciary to use great latitude and
discretion in the protection of individual liberty and not simply to
construe the Constitution strictly in favor of those rights specifically
enumerated.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it appears that the Ninth Amendment was meant to
possess two primary functions. First, it was to be a statement of intent;
an intention that the enumeration of certain rights in the first eight
amendments was not to be exhaustive but that those fundamenal though
unenumerated rights were nevertheless meant to be protected. Sec-
ondly, it was meant to be a statement of direction; directing the ju-
diciary back to the "due process of law" clause of the Fifth Amendment
and later toward 'the same clause in the Fourteenth Amendment and
imploring them for a broad interpretation of that clause in the protec-
tion of those fundamental, unenumerated rights inherent in all indi-
viduals in a free society. In other words, it was to serve as a guidepost
toward that provision which was specifically and historically con-
ceived and purposely included by the framers for the protection of
the individual from arbitrary and unreasonable action by government.
Therefore, to advocate a strict interpretation of the Constitution and
the several amendments and to limit its protection only to those rights
.76. Supra notes 58 and 59.
77. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
78. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 871 (1960).
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specifically enumerated would be to completely disregard and ignore
the Ninth Amendment and to misinterpret completely the broad pro-
tection afforded by "due process of law."
However, this is not to say that the Ninth Amendment contains
an independent source of rights which should be applied against the
states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment or that it should be
applied in toto against the Federal Government. It merely gives to the
judiciary direction toward the provision designed for the protection
of fundamental rights.
Therefore, it is completely unnecessary for the court to bend or.
stretch a specific provision of the Constitution or Bill of Rights to make
it fit a particular fundamental right which was not specifically enu-
merated within.79  The "due process" clause was historically conceived
to give solid recognition to this myriad of rights which it would be
virtually impossible to ever incorporate into any one document. As
Mr. Justice Harland has so aptly stated it:
While the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them
or any of their radiations. The Due Process Clause ... stands, in my
opinion, on its own bottom.80
This, in summary, is the Ninth Amendment, both in historical and
judicial perspective. Interpreted many ways and cited very little, it has
been largely forgotten 81 in the almost two centuries of our Constitu-
tional history. However, inadvertently, the courts have followed its
mandate and direction, although not consciously relying upon it, and
it is hopefully predicted that, in the future, whenever the courts en-
counter an unreasonable and arbitrary infringement of a fundamental,
inherent, and unenumerated right by government whether it be federal
or state, they will look to the Ninth Amendment as a guidepost toward
the constitutional provision historically conceived for the protection
of the fundamental rights of every individual.
David K. Sutelan
79. Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 74, at 1681. See generally, Mr. Justice Dougias;
opinion for the Court in which he states that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance."
80. Id., at 1690. See also, Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961).
81. See generally, PATrEEsoN, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH -AMENDMENT (1955).
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